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I. INTRODUCTION

It is a fundamental premise that in our profession fees must be reasonable
and not excessive! Although this standard has been in existence for many years,
there appears to have been very little effort to apply it.2 Occasionally clients
complain about excessive fees to the West Virginia Ethics Committee and such
claims either are rejected or the lawyers are required to return fees and are
reprimanded. Infrequently, an attorney loses his or her license for charging an

excessive fee

Very few of these situations, however, have involved contingency

fees in tort cases. Rather, they typically relate to excessive charges in the

I WEST VIRGINIA RULES OF PROFEssIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.5 (1996); see Committee on Legal
Ethics of the W. Va. State Bar v. Gallaher, 376 S.E.2d 346, 348 (W. Va. 1988); Committee on
Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State Bar v. Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d 107, 113-14 (W. Va. 1986); Henry
H.Drummonds, The Law and Ethics of Percentage ContingentFees in Oregon, 72 OR. L. REV. 859
(1993); see also Marc S. Klein, Refraining the 'Tort Reform' Debate (and OurParticipationIn 1t),
166 N.J. LAW., Jan. 1995, at 39, 42 (stating that "[p]rofessionalism has historically meant the
subordination of financial reward to social responsibility.").
2 Marc E. Williams, President'sColumn, DEF. TRIAL COUNs. OF W. VA. NEWsL. (Defense Trial
Counsel of W. Va., Huntington, W. Va.), Jan. 1996, at 1; see Martha Middleton, A Changing
Landscape,A.B.A. J.,
Aug. 1995, at 56.
3 The West Virginia State Bar has initiated a mediation program for persons with attorney fee
complaints. West Virginia State Bar Executive Director Tom Tinder reports that the system
traditionally offered no relief for other than the most egregious fees. Interview with Thomas R.
Tinder, Executive Director, West Virginia State Bar, in Charleston, W. Va. (Jan. 23, 1996). From
February 1995 to March 1996, the State Bar developed a voluntary fee-dispute mediation program
through which attorneys and clients can try to reach a compromise. Mr. Tinder reports that since
last February, the program has been involved in approximately seventy fee disputes. Forty-five of
those were resolved when a third-party called and spoke with the client and then with the attorney.
The other cases advanced to mediation, and in only a few cases have the parties been unable to
reach a compromise.
Nonetheless, it would appear that the problem is far from solved, especially in contingency
fees in tort litigation, where there is almost no questioning of percentage fee contracts with
plaintiff's lawyers. For a discussion of the ethical impact of fee misrepresentation, see Committee
on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State Bar v. Burdette, 445 S.E.2d 733 (W. Va. 1994).
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probating of estates and similar endeavors.4
ff. CONTINGENCY FEES ARE UNCONTROLLED INMOST TORT CASES

Contingency fees in tort cases are traditionally reviewed in West Virginia
in situations involving infants or incompetents.5 There are some specific types
of cases that require judicial review of fees, including bad faith claims and
statutorily based claims such as civil rights in which fees may be awarded to the
"prevailing party."6 Statutorily mandated fee approval involves the submission
of hours spent and funds expended on the plaintiffs' behalf, whether the matter
is a class action or simply falls within the ambit of legislation or judicial
precedent providing for recovery of attorneys' fees. However, in the vast
majority of contingent fee cases, there are no legislative or judicial controls.
Even in cases involving infants or incompetents, courts generally permit fees to
be charged pursuant to the attorney-client fee contract.
It has been argued that market forces will control fees;' however, while
that is undoubtedly true with hourly fees charged by defense counsel, such forces
appear to be virtually nonexistent with regard to plaintiffs' contingency fees in
the typical tort case. Because insurance companies and other corporations have
sufficient "market power" to negotiate and even dictate fees, the upward mobility

4 See Drummonds, supra note 1, at 867; see, e.g., Estate of Downing v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank,
184 Cal. Rptr. 511, 517-18 (Ct. App. 1982) (distinguishing ordinary and extraordinary duties in
determining fairness of fees).

' See NV. VA. CODE § 56-10-4 (Supp. 1996) (involving compromise of actions and suits on behalf
of infants and incompetents and the disbursement of funds arising therefrom).
See Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty, 352 S.E.2d 73, 77-80 (W. Va. 1986)
(regarding attorney's fee awards in bad faith claims, wherein there is only a presumption of an
entitlement to a one-third fee). Under federal law regarding civil rights, the prevailing party may
receive attorney fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994); Jenkins v. McCoy, 882 F. Supp. 549 (S.D.
NV. Va. 1995), af4'd, No. 93-6919 (4th Cir. Sept. 14, 1994); see also Drummonds, supra note 1
(recommending review of the reasonableness of percentage contingent fees in both disciplinary and
civil proceedings). Also, the West Virginia Human Rights Act allows an aggrieved party, in lieu
of pursuing an administrative remedy, to seek direct court action for damages, injunctive relief; and
attorney fees. See NV. VA. CODE § 5-11-8 (1994); Marshall v. Manville Sales Corp., 6 F.3d 229 (4th
Cir. 1993); [Employee Rts. & Employer Obligations] ADA (MB) § 10.51 (1993).
6

' For a discussion of the effects of market forces on fees generally, see Drummonds, supranote
1; John M. Lynn, Out of Control, 8 W. VA. LAW., Feb. 1995, at 14 [hereinafter Out of Control];
John M.Lynn, "No Brainer-Rebutal, 8 W.VA. LAW., May 1995, at 11 [hereinafter "No Brainer"
Rebuttal].
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of hourly rates is severely restricted. Indeed, many insurance and corporate
clients impose limitations on billing, such as flat fee requirements and the
absorption of certain expenses, thereby essentially obtaining "volume discounts"
for providing law firms with a flow of business! No definitive study has been

done. However, it appears that typical hourly rates for insurance defense work
in West Virginia are in the eighty to one hundred thirty dollar range, although
fees are somewhat higher in direct representation of large corporations.9

The argument has been made that plaintiffs' contingency fees should not
be regulated unless defense fees are subject to the same regulation." However,
such reasoning is flawed because, as noted, although there already is substantial

regulation of defense fees by market forces, virtually none exists in the case of
individual plaintiffs' contingency fees." In subrogation cases on behalf of
insurance companies or other corporations, contingency fees are often negotiated.
Thus, a substantial claim with relatively clear liability and probable financial
responsibility will not be subject to the one-third or forty percent fees almost

universally charged in plaintiffs' contingency tort work for individuals.
Plaintiffs' counsel, who carry the burden of proof, also complain that
defense lawyers can "run the clock" and thus charge excessive fees because of the

8 See Forest J. Bowman, Billing and Collection of Fees in a Competitive Market, BOWMAN'S
ETHIcs & MALPRACTiCE ALERT (Forest J. Bowman, Star City, W. Va.), Aug. 1995, at

1-2

(discussing new billing trends including new policies on hourly rates, fixed fees, contingency fees,
reverse contingency fees, combination fees, incremental fees and value billing and recommending
the use of such innovations to tailor fees to the client). "Fair and accurate billing depends on the
type of client being represented, how complicated the matter is, the degree of legal knowledge and
sophistication required, and the expertise of the lawyer." Id.
9 The 1994 Membership Survey of the West Virginia State Bar Association reports the following
statistics. In response to the question "When you charge on a [sic] hourly basis what is your usual
hourly rate?", the largest group of respondents (27%) reported charging between ninety-one and one
hundred ten dollars per hour. The next largest group (22%) reported charging sixty-six to ninety
dollars, followed by 11% that reported charging one hundred eleven to one hundred thirty-five
dollars. The survey's findings are broken down by years of practice, age of attorney, gender, form
of business and size of law office, and are available from West Virginia State Bar Executive
Director Tom Tinder.
10 See, e.g., Angela Wennihan, Let's Put the Contingency Back in the Contingency Fee, 49 SMU

L. REv. 1639, 1670 (1996); Michael Horowitz, Making Ethics Real, Making Ethics Work: A
Proposalfor Contingency Fee Reform, 44 EMORY L.J. 173, 183-85 (1995).

1 See Out of Control, supra note 7; "No Brainer"Rebuttal, supra note 7.
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time spent even if the hourly rates are held in check. 2 However, it is clear that
insurance companies and other corporations monitor closely the amount of time
their lawyers are spending in litigation. Thus, where an hourly rate is applied,
defense lawyers are not simply free to generate fees in an unbridled fashion.
Similarly, it is often said that insurance companies or other corporations
will use their lawyers to assert frivolous defenses and delay the processing of
claims solely to postpone payment of the inevitable recovery. 3 However, Rule
11 of the Federal and West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure is being applied
more often by the courts and provides a substantial disincentive for defense
counsel to engage in improper delaying tactics.14 Rule 11 also proscribes the
assertion of frivolous claims and other improper actions by plaintiffs' counsel.
Thus, it serves to prevent abuses during the litigation process. However, Rule 11

12

There are, of course, abuses on both sides. See Drummonds, supranote 1, at 864 n.22 (finding

that "[t]he hourly fee ...
cases.").
13

14

invites attorneys to spend more than the optimal amount of time on

"No Brainer"Rebuttal, supra note 7.
Id.
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does not serve to control fees charged to clients.15
El. INDivIDUAL PLAINTIFFS HAVE VERY L1TLE BARGAINING POWER IN
NEGOTIATING FEE ARRANGEMENTS

In the typical personal injury claim, whether it involves a vehicular
accident, product liability, medical malpractice or other tort claim, the client has
very little, if any, bargaining power, largely because most plaintiffs' firms charge
virtually identical fees. It may be that in rare cases an injured person who
becomes aware that he/she has a good case can demand some adjustment in the
fees, especially if liability appears even to the lay person to be virtually "open

West Virginia rules provide that:
Every pleading, motion and other paper of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose
address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign
his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when
otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified
or accompanied by affidavit, even though the pleadings to which they respond
are verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other
paper, that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law
or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a
pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court,
upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person who
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or
other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
W. VA. RL CIV. P. 11.
Plaintiffs' attorneys often accuse defense counsel and others who suggest controls on
excessive contingency fees of being "mouthpieces" for insurance companies and other corporate
clients. However, it is not clear exactly how a defense attorney would benefit if plaintiffs'
contingency fees were lower, because to the extent lower fees translate into fewer claims being filed,
defense lawyers would end up having less business. Presumably, insurance companies and other
corporate defendants would benefit in the long run to the extent the tort system becomes less
expensive. However, it is hard to evaluate exactly how reducing and controlling plaintiffs'
contingency fees would affect the system, other than to make it more fair for the individual client.
On the one hand, the plaintiff's attorney would have a strong incentive to settle a case for more
money in order to make up for the shortfall of fees. If the client is paying lower fees, however, the
net to the client would be greater and perhaps a case could be settled for a lower figure overall,
assuming, of course, that the client's interests are given paramount consideration.
'5
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and shut," the injuries are severe, and financial responsibility on the part of the
tortfeasor seems obvious. Such situations are, however, by far the exception
rather than the rule. It reasonably can be said that the typical prospective plaintiff
has almost no ability to negotiate with prospective counsel over fees, and indeed,
not enough sophistication even to attempt to do so. 16 Some lawyers may agree
to take a case on a 25% basis if it can be settled before suit, and an occasional
"maverick" will offer some further reduction; however, those cases are few and
far between. In fact, the customary fee contract provides for an additional 10%
over the basic fee if the case is appealed. These "standard" fee arrangements
have been in place for decades, and there is very little variation. Indeed, some
courts and legal scholars even have considered whether the standard one-third and
40% fees are violative of the antitrust laws as front price fixing.'7
It may be that one-third contingency fees can be reasonable in cases
where the liability case is not clear cut, the injuries are not severe, and/or the
potential damage recovery is not substantial; however, a 40% fee seems
excessive and difficult to justify, even in product liability or medical malpractice
cases, which are often more complex.'" In many contingency fee arrangements,
the fees paid can often be disproportionate to the risk taken, effort expended, and
results obtained. In fact, fees in catastrophic injury cases sometimes run into the

"6 See Drummonds, supranote 1, at 868-70.
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 781-83 (1975) (finding that a set fee schedule and
its enforcement mechanism constituted price-fixing); see also John E. Lopatka, Antitrust and
ProfessionalRules: A FrameworkforAnalysis, 28 SANDIEGO L. REv. 301 (1991); John G. Branca
& Marc I. Steinberg, Attorney Fee Schedules and Legal Advertising: The Implications of Goldfarb,
24 UCLA L. REv. 475 (1977).
17

s No

matter what the circumstances, a 40% fee contract seems to cross the line of reasonableness,

in that it rapidly approaches 50% of the total recovery and can exceed that 50% if costs are high
enough. In a case with any costs, a 40% base fee will exceed 50% if an appeal is taken and the
customary 10% appeal fee is included in the retainer agreement. In circumstances where the fee
even approaches 50%, however, the case takes on the complexion of being more the lawyer's case
than the client's.
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multiple hundreds and even thousands of dollars per hour expended. 9
Obviously, if a relatively unsophisticated person with a serious permanent
injury were to walk into a lawyer's office with a potential claim and the lawyer
indicated that he or she would take the case for one thousand dollars per hour,
such a fee would be deemed excessive ab initio. Undoubtedly the client would
refuse to enter into such a fee arrangement, recognizing it to be excessive.
Historically, there has been something sacrosanct about the contract between a
plaintiffs attorney and the client. However, an attorney has no more right to

contract for excessive fees on a contingency basis than on an hourly basis because
the prohibition on excessive fees is not dependent on the type of fee contract
involved. The only difference is that one can more readily tell whether a fee is
likely to be excessive at the beginning if it is on an hourly basis, but the
appropriateness of legal fees on a contingency basis cannot be evaluated
completely until the case essentially is at an end.2" Thus, because of a lack of
information concerning the time and effort spent on the case, contingency fee
arrangements can mask the fact that excessive fees are being charged.

1 While a plaintiff's attorney legitimately may earn a substantial fee in developing and pursuing
a claim against a defendant, when a third-party claim is initiated and prosecuted by the original
defendant (although adopted by the plaintiff), plaintiff's counsel may receive disproportionate
financial benefit from defense counsel's work if full fees are charged on the sums produced with
very little involvement by plaintiff's counsel. This could occur, for example, in a medical
malpractice case in which it is claimed that a product defect caused a medical condition in response
to which allegedly improper care was given. If the product aspect of such a case is conceived,
financed and pursued through discovery and trial primarily by the defendant and its counsel, and
a substantial sum thereby is made available to the plaintiff, it may be unconscionable for a
plaintiff's attorney to take a full fee "off the top." This seems especially true where the actualcosts
of the pursuit of the claim, including attorney's fees, also must be deducted from the recovery
pursuant to an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant/third-party plaintiff. When such
a case involves an infant or other incompetent, where any settlement would require court approval,
it would seem appropriate for a guardian ad litem to make a detailed inquiry and object if plaintiff's
counsel appears to be receiving a windfall to the detriment of the client.
Even an otherwise reasonable hourly fee approved by the client can become excessive if the
attorney bills an excessive number of hours. However, unlike contingency fees, where most clients
never understand or have input into his or her attorney's activities, clients billed on an hourly basis
typically receive itemized bills that explain the tasks undertaken and the hours expended. This
provides a client of any stature with the opportunity to question the work done and the time taken
to do it. While this system is not without flaw, it at least offers an additional safeguard to protect
clients from unprofessional billing practices. On the other hand, plaintiffs' lawyers historically have
not kept track of their time in typical contingency fee cases and, thus, the time spent on a case is
not subject to any meaningful review. For a further discussion of itemized billing, see Drummonds,
supranote 1 and Bowman, supra note 8.
2
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IV. A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP

EXISTS BETWEEN A LAWYER AND A
PROSPECTIVE CLIENT DURING FEE NEGOTIATIONS

Discussion has arisen about whether the fiduciary relationship between an
attorney and a potential client is formed at the beginning of the fee negotiation
or whether the attorney is free to negotiate for as much remuneration as possible
before formally entering into the relationship on the basis that the fiduciary duty
does not arise until after the retainer agreement is signed. Some argue that where
ethics are concerned, this is shaving the situation far too thinly and that an
attorney has a fiduciary duty to prospective clients as well as actual clients. This
is especially true where those prospective clients are unsophisticated and lack
appreciable bargaining power. After all, even though, as frequently advertised,
an attorney may agree not to charge for the initial meeting with the prospective
client that meeting is nevertheless a "consultation" with a professional, carrying
with it the obligation to provide sound advice as to how to proceed.2 '
V. "REFERRAL" FEES SHOULD BE LIMITED AND BASED ONLY ON WORK
PERFORMED AND RISK TAKEN

It also has been customary for attorneys to share fees when one attorney
refers a case to a second attorney; e.g., when an out-of-state attorney refers a case
to an in-state attorney, the referring attorney generally receives a share of the fee
(usually one-third), regardless of the amount of work performed. The West

Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct provide some limitation on this practice
but do not prohibit referral fees completely, even where no significant amount of
2 In fact, it seems clear that attorneys do have a responsibility (i.e., fiduciary duty) to "prospective

clients." Nolan v. Forman, 665 F.2d 738, 739 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982); see DeVaux v. American Home
Assurance Co., 444 N.E.2d 355, 357 (Mass. 1983) (finding that "[a]n attorney-client relationship
need not rest on an express contract," but may exist "'when (1) a person seeks advice or assistance
from an attorney, (2) the advice or assistance sought pertains to matters within the attorney's
professional competence, and (3) the attorney expressly or impliedly agrees to give or actually gives
the desired advice or assistance'); Drummonds, supra note 1 (finding it most important that
attorneys work to limit the conflict in economic interest by offering alternatives to clients and
advising them whether a contingency fee is in their best interest). In an era in which television and
print ads offer 'ree initial consultations," can there be any doubt that the person is consulting with
the attorney as an attorney even at that initial stage? Therefore, is it possible for the attorney to
negotiate a fee (with less thanfidl disclosure) without crossing the bounds of economic conflicts of
interest? And is it appropriate in a catastrophic injury case, for example, to recommend that the
"client" have the fee agreement reviewed by another attorney to determine if the fee arrangement
offered by the attorney initially consulted is reasonable? While the problem currently may be
without a clear solution, it nonetheless warrants serious consideration, in that fee negotiation
demands caution and a clear recognition of the opportunities and dangers of self interest.
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work has been performed in the case by the referring attorney.22 The rationale
seems to be that, as between the general practitioner and the specialist, such
referral fees are permissible as long as the total fee to the client is not increased.
However, if the specialist will handle the case for two-thirds of the fee arranged

by the attorney originally consulted, as a practical matter, the total fee is
excessive. In such a case, the referral fee process builds in an artificial one-third
increase in the fee that otherwise would have been acceptable if the client
consulted the specialist in the first place and had the requisite bargaining power
to negotiate for the lowest fee the specialist would have been willing to accept.

As in the medical field, it is incumbent upon attorneys to place the
interests of clients first and to refer cases beyond their practice area or expertise
'
to more qualified colleagues without obtaining a "piece of the action."23
If the
referring attorney has spent time reviewing the case, that attorney should be paid
a reasonable hourly sum and the case should be transferred to a specialist without
a referral fee. If,
of course, the attorney initially consulted has spent considerable
time on the case or the attorneys decide to work together, the total fee should be
divided on the basis of the work performed. It also would seem that the financial
risk taken by the respective attorneys (i.e., the expenses advanced) should be

2 Rule 1.5 provides that:
(e) A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm
may be made only if:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each
lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint
responsibility for the representations;
(2) the client is advised of and does not object to the participation of
all the lawyers involved; and
(3) the total fee is reasonable.
(4) the requirements of "services performed" and "joint responsibility"
shall be satisfied in contingent fee cases when: (1) a lawyer who is regularly
engaged in the full time practice of law evaluates a case and forwards it to
another lawyer who is more experienced in the area or field of law being
referred; (2) the client is advised that the lawyer who is more experienced in the
area or field of law being referred will be primarily responsible for the litigation
and that there will be a division of fees; and, (3) the total fee charged the client
is reasonable and in keeping with what is usually charged for such matters in
the community.
WEST VIRGINIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.5 (1996).
23 Certainly, physicians do not engage in referral fees. When a general practitioner refers a case
to a surgeon, for example, it is unheard of for the referring physician to expect or receive a portion
of the surgeon's charges for surgery. Rather, each physician charges only for services actually
performed. In fact, it is illegal for one physician to give "kick backs" to a referring physician. W.
VA. CODE § 30-3-14 (1993).
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considered as well.24
There is no doubt that "finders' fees" encourage generalists to serve as
clearinghouses, pulling in all possible plaintiffs for redirection for a share of the
contingency fee. As a practical matter, this decreases the amount of the recovery
by each client assuming the fee negotiation process otherwise would have worked
properly. Indeed, this referral fee practice seems to be regarded as suspect by
some professional organizations, such as the American Bar Association. The
ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility outlaws the division of fees
among attorneys unless the client consents after full disclosure, the division is
made according to the work done by each attorney, and the total fee remains
reasonable, without making provisions for referrals.' However, the ABA Model
Code does not make exceptions for referrals to specialists.
VI. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL CONTROLS ARE NECESSARY To PREVENT

ABUSES INFEE NEGOTIATION AND LEGAL REPRESENTATION
Contingency fees serve a useful purpose in our civil justice system by
affording representation to those who do not have the resources to hire counsel
on an hourly or even flat fee basis. However, it is clear that legislative and
judicial controls are necessary to prevent abuses. Indeed, many states have had

24

Incongruities can result, however, when a disproportionately large share of a fee is received by

an attorney who advances expenses but does not devote any appreciable time to working on the
case. Consider a hypothetical situation of one attorney working up a complicated case and spending
a thousand hours in the process and another attorney in another firm advancing $100,000 in
expenses. It would seem inappropriate from a fair allocation standpoint for the financial backer to
receive the same fee, plus reimbursement of the expenses advanced, as the attorney who actually
produced the results in the case through his or her efforts. For example, if the fee in such a case
were $500,000, the financial backer would be reimbursed the $100,000 advanced and also would
receive a $250,000 fee, assuming the standard practice is followed of the fee coming "off the top."
If the advanced sums were outstanding an average of one year, the financial backer would net a
250% profit, quite a return by any standards, even in a relatively risky venture. The other attorney,
of course, would receive $250 an hour, which, although a substantial hourly rate, pales by
comparison to the profit made by the attorney backing the case.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmIL1TY DR 2-107 (1981).
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legislative intervention into the contingency fee arena.2' New York, for example,
has developed a fee schedule in medical malpractice cases that imposes limits on
the percentages charged, depending upon the amount of recovery. The New York
fee schedule is as follows:
30% of the first $250,000 of the sum recovered;
25% of the next $250,000 of the sum recovered;
20% of the next $500,000 of the sum recovered;
15% of the next $250,000 of the sum recovered;
10% of any amount over $1,250,000 of the sum recovered.
Computed on net sum recovered (after costs)27
While this fee schedule seems reasonable on its face, the New York
Legislature has recognized that it could be unduly restrictive in certain instances.
Thus, it has included a provision that allows lawyers to petition the court for

26 See,

e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6147 (Deering Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
52-251c (West 1958); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, par. 5/2-1114 (Smith-Hurd 1992); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 2961 (West 1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 601 (West 1996); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 507-C:8 (1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.5 (1992); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 26, §
4111 (1991); V.I. CODEANN. tit. 27, § 166f(Supp. 1989).
In the 1996 session of the West Virginia Legislature, a bill was introduced that would
limit attorney fees for tort claims. The proposed law would limit fees to "40% of the first $50,000;
25% [sic] of the next $500,000; and 15% of any amount exceeding $600,000." Bill Limiting
Attorneys' TortFees Introduced, LEGIs. REP. (West Virginia Chamber of Commerce, Charleston,
W. Va.), Feb. 22, 1996, at 2; H.R. 4627, 72nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1996). For a discussion of other
lawsuit reform legislation introduced or to be introduced in West Virginia, see Lawsuit Reform
Legislation, NEWS L. (Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse of S. W. Va., Charleston, W. Va.) Feb.
1996, at 5.
I N.Y. JuD. LAw § 474-a (McKinney Supp. 1996). The possible impact of such a law is readily
apparent. Assuming a recovery of $2,000,000, an attorney would receive $800,000 plus
reimbursement of costs under the typical 40% fee arrangement. If the costs exceed $200,000, which
is not inconceivable in a complex medical malpractice or product liability case, the client would
receive less than 50% of the proceeds. Under the New York statute, the attorney would receive
$350,000 plus costs. Both calculations assume that fees are deducted before costs, which is standard
in most fee agreements. Assuming the converse were the case, and assuming $200,000 in costs, the
40% fee arrangement would net the attorney $720,000, while the net under the New York statute
would be $330,000.
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additional fees in exceptional cases.2" It has been suggested that the standard that
should be applied in statutes such as these is whether the statutorily specified fee
is adequate based on the risk taken by the lawyer, the effort expended by the
lawyer, and the results obtained for the client.29 In fact, it would be difficult to

2 The New York statutes allow that:

In the event that claimant's or plaintiff's attorney believes in good faith that the
fee schedule set forth in subdivision two of this section, because of
extraordinary circumstances, will not give him adequate compensation,
application for greater compensation may be made upon affidavit with written
notice and an opportunity to be heard to the claimant or plaintiff and other
persons holding liens or assignments on recovery.
N.Y. JUD. LAW § 474-a (4). It would appear, however, that the New York courts are hesitant to
depart from the statutory guidelines, strictly construing the word "extraordinary." In Yalango v.
Popp, the court found that equitable compensation is the key. For instance, the court found that:
[the] statutory fee may be inadequate... where the case involves an extremely
complicated procedural history or where plaintiff's counsel is required to expend
an inordinate amount of time in pursuing the medical malpractice claim, thereby
rendering the hourly rate of compensation exceptionally low or causing a loss
of other income or some other financial detriment.
Yalango v. Popp, 644 N.E.2d 1318, 1322 (N.Y. 1994), motion to amend denied, 651 N.E.2d 917
(N.Y. 1995), rev'd, 648 N.Y.S.2d 763 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). At issue in Popp was a medical
malpractice claim centered on complications following brain surgery that resulted in severe and
permanent brain damage, blindness and quadriplegia. Id. at 1320. Plaintiff's counsel settled the
case pre-trial for $1,930,000, and plaintiff's counsel received a fee of $338,731.74 (or approximately
$550 per hour for the 620 hours counsel estimated working). Id. Counsel moved the court to
increase the fee to one-third of the recovery, or $629,105.81. Id. The supreme court (i.e., lower
court in New York) granted counsel's motion, and the appellate division affirmed. Id. at 1320-21.
In reversing the lower courts, the court of appeals found that counsel failed to put forth a threshold
showing of inadequacy. Popp, 644 N.E.2d at 1322. Because counsel failed in the initial burden
of proof, the court did not have to address the issue of "extraordinary circumstances"; however,
the court nonetheless stated that degree of diligence, complexity of issues and successful outcome
would not have qualified as "extraordinary" so as to depart from the statutory fees. Id. at 1323.
Indeed, the court stated that it expects zealous representation and that all medical malpractice actions
have a level of complexity that requires extensive and sophisticated preparation. As for the
"succes' quotient, the court found that it was already reflected in the statutory breakdown. Id. at
1323. The court finally stated that among the factors that could have demonstrated extraordinary
circumstances were loss of income or practice, or devotion of an inordinate amount of time. Id. at
1324. See also Reid v. County of Nassau, 600 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1993) (finding sufficient $397,638.35
in fees for the settlement of an obstetrical medical malpractice case for $3,020,000, even in light
of the parties' consideration of a novel legal issue); In re Estate of Clinton, 597 N.Y.S.2d 900 (N.Y.
Sur. 1993) (finding sufficient a $226,829 fee on a $979,697 settlement of a wrongful death action).
It is unclear, of course, whether the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia would apply the
same criteria in determining what constitutes "extraordinary circumstances."
29

Drummonds, supranote 1, at 883-91.
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construct a credible argument that it is somehow unfair for a lawyer to have his
or her fees reviewed on the basis of these factors. Freedom of contract often is
cited as a way to circumvent this fundamentally sound logic;3" however, if, as it
should, the fiduciary duty of a lawyer to a client extends to the negotiation of
fees, retainer agreements may turn out to be unconscionable because of the
circumstances under which they are created. Thus, regulation of fees seems
abundantly reasonable, when the concept of fairness is applied to each case.
VII. "FEE POOLING" ARGUMENTS SHOULD NOT BE USED To JUSTIFY EXCESSIVE
FEES
Plaintiffs' counsel have for many years advanced the so-called "fee
pooling" argument which means that one client may have to pay excessive fees
in his or her case to make up for the inability of the attorney to earn adequate,
or any, fees in some other cases. Obviously, the fallacy of this reasoning is that
each client deserves equitable treatment in the cost of legal representation, and
one client who has a particularly severe injury and a claim with relatively clear
liability should not have to pay the price for other cases which have less merit
and perhaps should not have been brought.3" If lawyers engaged in full disclosure
and explained that the client may end up subsidizing other individuals, the client
who has a good case no doubt would be reluctant to hire the attorney. Indeed,
an enhanced duty must be imposed on lawyers to inform clients fully of their
options and the appropriateness of the proposed relationship before entering into
retainer agreements. It is well established law that physicians have a duty to
obtain "informed consent" from patients before embarking on a course of
treatment.32 Lawyers also must provide full disclosure to their clients, not only
on such things as the length of time, cost, and risk of the anticipated legal
proceedings, but also with regard to the appropriateness of the type of fee and,
in contingency fee cases, of the percentages charged.
Rather than asking some clients to subsidize other clients, a more
reasonable method for guarding against substantial losses in contingency cases

30

See, e.g., id. at 872 n.56 (discussing the enforcement of contingent fees under contract theory);

id. at 882-83.(discussing the effect caps and sliding scales have on the availability of competent
legal counsel).
31 Id. at

873-75 (arguing that "lawyers owe a duty to particular clients, not to the set of people who

are their clients generally").
Cross v. Trapp, 294 S.E.2d 446 (W. Va. 1982) (measuring the scope of a doctor's duty to
disclose against what the doctor knew or should have known to be the patient's need to know).
32
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would be for attorneys to evaluate cases carefully before they accept
representation. This could include providing for an evaluation period in the
retainer agreement, after which the attorney and the client can revisit the issues
of fees and the appropriateness of proceeding with the case. In the somewhat rare
situation where a plaintiff comes in with a serious case and has a very short time
left on the statute of limitations, a voluntary tolling of the statute can be obtained
in many instances, or the case can be filed with a clear indication that it is to be
held in abeyance until the situation is evaluated further.
The Legislature could assist with this process by providing for
a
notification of intent to sue and a brief period (perhaps sixty to ninety days)
within which the complaint must be filed. In that time frame, competent
attorneys should be able to investigate the case sufficiently to know whether or
not it has merit. The success of a case, of course, is never completely assured.
Thus, substantial fees may be justified. There is no reason to believe that the fee
schedule adopted by New York, for example, would place an undue burden on
lawyers in most cases; rather, only in the cases in which the risk, effort and
results are extraordinary should the fee be greater than that outlined by the
statute.
VIII. PERCENTAGE CONTiNGENCY FEES SHOULD BE CALCULATED ON THE NET

RECOVERY (I.E., AFTER DEDUCTION OF COSTS)

Almost without exception, plaintiffs' attorneys' fees are calculated from
the total amount of the settlement or verdict before costs are taken into
consideration. The New York statute prohibits this practice and requires that the
fee be calculated on the "net" recovery (i.e., after costs are deducted).3 3 In states
such as West Virginia which do not preclude this practice, the client frequently
is charged, in effect, one-third or 40% of monies that the plaintiff's lawyer
expends on the client's behalf and recoups in full through the settlement or other
recovery. In other words, the lawyer spends the money up front, recoups the
money and then charges the client a fee ("interest," in essence) for having
advanced the money. Alternatively, in the rare case in which the client advances
all or a portion of the litigation costs, in recouping those costs for the client, the
lawyer actually takes a fee from the monies that the lawyer recoups that were
paid in originally by the client and that were intended to be returned to the client.
In a $1,000,000 recovery in a relatively expensive medical malpractice
case where the lawyer expends $100,000, the lawyer gets a full return of that
$100,000, as well as a $40,000 fee on the money. This, in effect, "marks up" the

" N.Y. JUD. LAW § 474-a.
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money advanced by 40%, in addition to the fee obtained on the net proceeds
recovered. 4 Similarly, if the client in a rare case advances $100,000 to attempt
to further the interests of the case and the lawyer also charges a fee of $40,000
on that amount, the client ends up paying 40% more in costs than actually were
expended in the course of the litigation. Not coincidentally, the interests of the
lawyer who stands to make a contingency fee are furthered as well. Either way,
it would appear that the "little guy" is the loser. Indeed, it would seem that many
of these transactions may be usurious."
Despite claims by plaintiffs' lawyers that fees conforming with "standard"
arrangements are never excessive, they appear to be unwilling to have those fees
scrutinized, except where scrutiny is required by statute or by specific judicial
precedent.3 6 As noted earlier, even in such cases the courts are reluctant to
disturb the fee entitlements set forth in the retainer agreement. At the very least,
the contracted-for fee appears to be given presumptive validity, both by guardians
ad litem and by courts."

Perhaps lawyers who advance monies should be entitled to apply interest at the prevailing rate
for the time funds have been outstanding. In any event, the fact that substantial monies were
advanced by the attorney, thereby increasing his or her risk, should factor into a determination of
the appropriateness of the fee charged.
It would be interesting to calculate the "rate of return" obtained by the attorney in such cases and
measure that against statutes prohibiting usurious transactions. See W. VA. CODE § 47-6-6 (1995).
For a further consideration of greed and usury in our profession, see Allison F. Aranson, The United
States Percentage Contingent Fee System: Ridicule and Reform from an InternationalPerspective,
27 TEX. INT'L L.J. 755, 767-73 (1992).
3

36

See W. VA.

CODE §

56-10-4 (Supp. 1996).

Courts have recognized that contingency fee contracts have not received the same scrutiny as
have commercial contracts. Jenkins v. McCoy, 882 F. Supp. 549, 555 n.10 (S.D.W. Va. 1995).
Recently, support is being expressed more loudly for the idea of courts reviewing contingency fees,
sua sponte, if need be, focusing on the reasonableness of the fee in light of the negotiation of the
fee and the performance of the contract. Id. at 555-56. Traditionally courts have appointed
guardians ad litem to fulfill the duty of investigating the case and making recommendations as to
the settlement and the appropriateness of the fee. Indeed, recent case law suggests that guardians
ad litem can be held responsible for failures to do so. Increased judicial scrutiny of the work done
by guardians may reflect a concern that some guardians ad litem have "rubber stamped" their way
through some of their duties. See, e.g., In re Lindsey C., 473 S.E.2d 110 (W. Va. 1995); Jackson
Gen. Hosp. v. Davis, 464 S.E.2d 593 (W. Va. 1995).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol99/iss1/5

16

Annand and Green: Legislative and Judicial Controls of Contingency Fees in Tort Cas
19961

CONTNGENCY FEES IN TORT CASES

IX. ANY WORKABLE SOLUTION INVOLVING THE JUDICIARY WOULD REQUIRE
MODIFICATION OF THE JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS AND/OR LIMITATIONS ON
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS BY ATTORNEYS
Plaintiffs' attorneys claim that there are virtually no abuses of the system.
However, it does not take a great deal of experience to come across cases in
which clients have been charged extremely excessive fees.3" This is not to say,
however, that implementing a new policy would be without its own challenges.
One of the problems in applying the New York-type statute in any state in which
judges are elected39 is that there can be an "appearance of impropriety" in
situations where the court reviews plaintiffs' attorneys' fees simply because
lawyers typically are substantial contributors to judicial campaigns.4" It is
axiomatic that these types of situations present a potential conflict, despite the
probability that the vast majority of judges are not motivated by concern for
whether one side or the other has or will support a judicial campaign. The
Canons of Judicial Ethics clearly provide, however, that a judge shall not engage
in any conduct which has the appearance of impropriety, and lawyers are

39

See supranote 18.

Charles McElwee, Judicial Reform: Election of Judges an Unseemly Practice, CHARLESTON
GAZETiE, Feb. 26, 1996, at 5A.
39

40

In New York certain state and city judges are appointed by the governor. See, e.g., N.Y.

CONST. art. VI, §§ 9, 21; N.Y. JUD. LAW § 68 (McKinney 1987). However, the campaigning
activities of the elected judges are severely curtailed. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAW app. Canon 7
(McKinney 1992) (finding in pertinent part that it would be improper for a judge who is a judicial

candidate to solicit an attorney's endorsement of his candidacy or solicit others to do so on his
behalf, and a lawyer seeking judicial office would stand in no different position), see also Rochelle
Olson, Injury Lawyers Biggest Donors in JudicialRaces, CHARLESTON

GAZETtE,

May 21, 1996,

at IC.
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proscribed from any such conduct as well.4 It would be disingenuous to argue
that it does not present at least an appearanceof impropriety for judges to receive
money from lawyers for election and re-election campaigns and then be put in a
position of having to determine appropriateness of substantial legal fees for such
lawyers. It does not seem that adequate consideration has been given to whether
the application for fees by lawyers can pose a conflict in some instances. This,
of course, applies both to plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers, as well as to the
litigants themselves.42 Because of the potential conflicts and other difficulties
associated with judicial campaign financing, it would seem that judges would
invite a change in the system.43
Plainly, the answer to the problem is to take lawyers and others out of the
judicial campaign financing business, either by adopting a full-scale judicial merit
selection process, which has been strongly supported,44 or, as an interim step,

41 WEST VIRGINIA CODE OF JuDIcIAL CONDuCr Canon 2 (1996).

A judge shall avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge's activities. Id. WEST VIRGINIA RULES OF
PROFEssIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.1-3.9 (1996), see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILiTY DR 9-101 (1981). The abuses of elections generally have been chronicled widely.
See, e.g., Jane Fritsch, When is Campaign Gift a Bribe?, SUNDAY GAzETtE-MAIL, Jan. 28, 1996,
at 5B; see also Lawrence Messina, High CourtNominee is Accused of Bias, CHARLESTON GAzETE,
May 29, 1996, at IA; Lawrence Messina, Starcher Comments To Be Reviewed, CHARLESTON
GAZETrE, May 30, 1996 at IC; Lawrence Messina, High Court Hopeful Steps Down from Case,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, May 31, 1996, at IA; Lawrence Messina, StarcherDenies Bias in Asbestos
Cases, CHARLESTON GAZETrE, June 6, 1996, at 8A; Lawrence Messina, StarcherCited as Example
of JudicialPolitics, CHARLESTON GAzErrE, July 9, 1996, at C1; FederalJudge Sends Asbestos
Lawsuits Back to Crcuit Court, CHARLESTON GAzETrE, July 24, 1996, at 2A; Lawrence Messina,
More Oppositionfor Court Hopeful: Lawyers File Anti-Starcher Motion, CHARLESTON GAZETrE,
July 31, 1996, at 7A; Lawrence Messina, Two Other Candidates Citedfor Ethics, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Oct. 3, 1996, at 3A; Lawrence Messina, StarcherSupported by Lawyers: High Court
Campaign Drawing Contributions, SUNDAY GAZETrE-MAIL, Nov. 3, 1996, at IC.
42

There also is a potential conflict if the client seeking a judicial determination of a legal issue is a

campaign supporter of the judge called upon to make a ruling.
41 Surprisingly, a majority of the Circuit Court judges in West Virginia present at the Judicial

Conference held Oct. 16-20, 1995, at the Gateway Inn, Barboursville, WV, voted against
implementing a merit selection process.
McElwee, supra note 39; Thomas V. Flaherty, Selecting Judges, W. VA. LAW., Oct. 1995, at 4.
In West Virginia, the subject of the merit selection of judges has been discussed by various civic
groups and has been the subject of joint resolutions by both houses of Ihe West Virginia Legislature,
although both resolutions died in committee. H.R.J. Res. 17, 72d Leg., 2d Sess. (1996); S.J. Res.
7, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1996); Philip B. Hill, Merit Selection of Judges Reviewed, CHARLESTON
GAZETrE, Mar. 15, 1996, at 4A.
"
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modifying judicial campaigns to prevent financing through outside sources." This
could be accomplished, perhaps, by increasing court filing fees and creating a
fund of money that is distributed equally to those running for judicial office for
purposes of public information campaigning, e.g., education, training, experience,
etc. Sixteen states hold nonpartisan elections for their judges and twenty-one

states have eliminated the process of judicial elections altogether. 6
X. CONCLUSION

In a profession that relies intrinsically on reasonableness and on ethical
behavior, it is unfortunate that abuses continue to exist in the fee arena. While
traditionally the discussion of what is to be done about potentially excessive fees
has degenerated into far-from-professional squabbles centering on whether
plaintiffs' or defense lawyers have the clearest opportunity to transgress, the time
has come for something to be done about the pricing system generally. Lost in
the barrage have been the unsophisticated clients who do not have sufficient
power to negotiate reasonable fee agreements for themselves and yet have to rely
on attorneys for advice and for representation. One solution that appears
workable is a statutory contingency fee structure, combined with judicial review
in order to ensure that the fee received and paid fairly reflects the risks, efforts,
and results involved. It is clear that there are numerous abuses in the current

' Another potential (albeit only partial) solution to this problem would be to restrict the campaign
contributions attorneys can make, or even eliminate such contributions completely. However,
attorneys, like other citizens, arguably have the right/privilege to participate fully in the election
process, including making contributions to judicial campaigns. One safeguard that could be placed
upon the system, however, would be to impose complete anonymity on contributions made by
attorneys (and others) in judicial elections. Indeed, other.facets of campaign contributions, such as
disbursements by committee treasurers, verified financial statements, and information required in
financial statements, are protected from even the appearance of impropriety by detailed statutory
guides. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 3-8-2a to -12 (Supp. 1996). It would be interesting to see
whether, once legally imposed safeguards requiring anonymity were in place, contributions to
judicial campaigns would wane. Several organizations are seeking solutions to the problem of the
appearance or actual improprieties arising from lawyers' contributions to judicial campaigns. These
organizations include Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse (CALA), a grass-roots organization working
to educate citizens on problems with the civil justice system, as well as Attorneys For Integrity, Inc.,
a not-for-profit corporation formed as a vehicle for individual attorneys to pledge "'not to provide
any financial support nor make any monetary contribution to any judicial election campaign.'
Letter from Robert L. Branfass, President, Attorneys For Integrity, Inc., to practicing attorneys
(Oct./Nov. 1996) (on file with author). See also Kay Michael, Lawyer Asks Others To End
Contributions,CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Oct. 29, 1996, at IA.
46 McElwee, supra note 39.
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contingency fee system. It is also clear that fundamental fairness requires a fee
approval system in which the reasonableness of contingency fees is determined
by judges, coupled with legislative guidance. This is especially true if judicial
election procedures and campaign financing laws are changed to free the courts
from the appearance of impropriety.
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